Título: Comentario del paper "Axioms for deferred acceptance",
Expositor: Agustín Bonifacio :
Abstract: The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agentproposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity—are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent-proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non-wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non-wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity.
Referencia: Kojima and Manea (2010) "Axioms for deferred acceptance", Econometrica, Vol. 78, No. 2, 633-653.