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Titulo de la charla: " Expectations, cores, and strategy-proofness for allocation problems with externalities."
Expositora: María H. Fonseca
Abstract: We study allocation problems with externalities in which agents have expectations about the reactions of the other agents to group deviations. We present a concept of core based on those expectations. We identify the largest and smallest cores, and show that our model encompasses and generalize several core consistent solutions previously considered by the literature to deal with allocation problems with externalities. We explore the relation between cores and strategy-proofness, providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of strategy-proof, individually rational, and efficient mechanisms.